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Abstract 
 
Monarchy has two elements, autocratic government and hereditary succession to office. 
After surveying arguments for and against hereditary access to public office, the paper 
illustrates that theoretical explanations of the rise of representative government do not 
account for the abolition or preservation of hereditary monarchy in contemporary 
democratic states. The paper then distinguishes between proximate and fundamental 
causes of the fall of monarchy. The former are military defeat, dissolution of the state as a 
result of war defeat and decolonization, and revolution. Fundamental causes are those 
that explain how proximate causes led to the overthrow of the monarchy and focus on the 
failures of monarchs to preserve national unity and to withdraw from a politically active 
role. 
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1 Introduction 
Monarchy, rule by one person, is typically associated with autocracy and hereditary 
succession. Since the ancient times monarchy has been the most common system of 
government. The monarch – autocrat was the head of state and the head of government. 
With different degrees of success, monarchs often strove to assume absolute control, but 
in practice councils of notables limited royal power with various degree of effectiveness.
1
 
Neither did lineage secure succession; who wore the crown had been violently contested 
without necessarily questioning the institution of monarchy.
2
 In modern times, the link 
between hereditary rule and autocratic government was broken by the English ‘Glorious 
Revolution’ of 1688, which gradually fashioned the institution of constitutional 
monarchy, where the monarch is substantively and procedurally constrained, so that he 
reigns as the head of state but does not govern. From the late eighteenth century onwards 
kingship by the grace of god was challenged and as a result of a host of economic, social 
and ideological changes, government by the consent of the people expressed in fair 
elections prevailed.  
In the democratic transition of the nineteenth and twentieth century, some of the existing 
and emerging nation–states adopted constitutional monarchy, some abolished the 
monarchy and established republican orders and yet others overthrew their royal 
dynasties without establishing democracy. The following conundrum then arises: If 
winning a competitive election is a fairer and more egalitarian method to assume office 
than hereditary succession (Manin, 1997), how comes and in some democracies the office 
of the head of state is still determined by birth right, while in others it is filled through 
some form of representation? To put it another way, why the monarchy was overthrown 
in some democracies but not in others? And did the overthrow of the monarchy lead to 
democratic government?  
                                                 
1
 See Congleton (2011) for an analysis of the “king–and–council” template further 
discussed in Section 3. Finer (1999) offers an authoritative historical account of the monarchy 
from ancient to modern times and the evolution of government from autocratic to democratic.  
2
 For example, the medieval Byzantine Empire lacked a fixed rule for succession and 
experienced a large turnover of imperial families. In England the monarchy became hereditary on 
the basis of primogeniture after the 1066 Norman Conquest. In France it became so in the 12
th
 
century with Philip–Augustus (1139–1223). On the other hand, in the Holy Roman Empire of 
Germany the king was elected by a seven–man electoral college of local princes. 
 2 
Political economy has examined autocratic–dictatorial government3; however, monarchy 
and dictatorship differ fundamentally in relation to entry to office and succession: Kings 
are typically hereditary rulers while dictators are usurpers. Political economy has also 
studied the transformation from autocracy to democracy, the extension of franchise to 
poorer classes of the population and the establishment of representative government, but 
has ignored the survival or demise of the king as the hereditary head of state. This is the 
question addressed in the present paper. In order to present a complete account Section 2 
reviews political economy explanations of hereditary succession to office focusing on 
peaceful conflict resolution and the gains from a de–politicized head of state. Section 3 
surveys recent theories of democratization and points out that they fail to explain the fall 
of hereditary monarchy. This issue is taken up in Section 4 which identifies proximate 
and fundamental causes of the fall of the monarchy. The former are military defeat after a 
major war, dissolution of the state as a result of war defeat or decolonization, and 
revolutions; it is also noted that republics were often legitimized by holding a 
referendum. Fundamental causes are those that explain why did war defeats, dissolution 
of the state and revolutions precipitated the overthrow of the monarchy; they focus on the 
failures of monarchs to preserve national unity and to withdraw from a politically active 
role. 
2 Political economy justifications of hereditary succession  
2.1 Hereditary succession and conflict resolution 
Hereditary monarchy provides an efficient mechanism of conflict resolution that in turn 
leads to regime stability. A fixed and well–known rule of hereditary succession upon the 
death of a ruler minimizes uncertainty and violence that may follow when rival groups 
fight for control. North (1981), Tullock (1987) and (2002), and Olson (1993) emphasize 
that a society reaps important efficiency gains when ruled by a “stationary bandit” rather 
than being pray to a “roving bandit”, as the former pursues policies that reflect a longer 
                                                 
3
 For an economic analysis of the dictator – autocrat as a utility maximizing “state 
proprietor”, see Tullock (1987) and (2002), Grossman (2002), Grossman and Noh (1994), and 
McGuire and Olson (1996). In his influential work on dictatorship, Wintrobe (1998) distinguishes 
between different types of dictators – autocrats depending on their objectives (personal 
consumption and power) and the instruments used (repression and loyalty). 
 3 
horizon.
4
 Kurrild–Klitgaard (2000) discussing the Danish monarchy in the period 935–
1849, argues that knowing who will succeed “changes the payoffs and puts limits upon 
the possible coalitions and thereby supports a structure–induced equilibrium of peaceful 
succession”. (p.71)  
Stability in turn lends legitimacy: Governments are by necessity coercive; obedience to 
the edicts of government is easier when citizens recognise the legitimacy of the ruler. 
Finer (1999) divides the sources of the monarch’s legitimacy into two, charisma, “the gift 
of grace”, and tradition, where with the passage of time the ruler is recognised as 
legitimate on grounds of lineage from the original charismatic monarch. Similarly, 
Tullock (1987) argues that support for an autocratic ruler is a function of time; the longer 
the ruler stays in power, the more legitimacy he has and the more likely he is to stay in 
power. A long–existing monarchy is therefore seen as legitimate simply because “it has 
always been there”.5 Contrary to members of the royal family, contenders for power 
lacking bloodline ties will have a weaker case for legitimacy. Even if the occupant of the 
throne has few leadership abilities, and the country is effectively governed by officials 
drawn from the groups that support the regime, such officials can only act in the name of 
the king; otherwise their decisions may be challenged. As a corollary, kings who enjoy 
legitimacy are able to devote more resources to personal consumption rather than their 
security.  
The force of such arguments led Tullock (1987) to argue that in the long–run a dictator 
resolves the issue of succession by establishing a hereditary rule and establishes a 
                                                 
4
 This was first articulated by the fourth century BCE Athenian orator Isocrates who 
wrote “...men permanently in charge are much better than others by experience even if less well-
endowed by nature. Men who hold office for a year ignore many matters and pass the buck to 
others, while monarchs neglect nothing because they know that the responsibility for everything 
lies with them ... But the greatest difference is this: men under other governments give attention 
to the affairs of state as if they were the concern of others; monarchs, as if they were their own 
concern. And … monarchies excel … in war.” Isocrates, Nicocles of Cyprus, 3.21 – 3.22. 
Available at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/collection?collection=Perseus:collection:Greco-Roman  
5
 This echoes earlier arguments of Kuehnelt–Leddihn (1956) that “If the regime of the 
tyrant becomes consolidated, restrictive measures can be relaxed in proportion as his rule gains 
security and even a semblance of legitimacy" (emphasis in the original). 
 4 
monarchy.
6
 He further suggests that dynastic succession also reduces (although does not 
eliminate) the risk of assassination of the ruler – king by other contestants; sons knowing 
that they will inherit the throne may be less inclined to kill their fathers. In addition, as 
Congleton (2011) observes, dynastic organisations strengthen the incentive of parents to 
consider the long–term consequences of their decisions carefully in order to safeguard the 
prospects of their children. Dynastic succession then partly solves the “successor’s 
dilemma”, that is, the sitting ruler may be threatened by a designated successor who 
builds enough independent support to ensure his succession against his rivals; however, if 
the designated successor fails to build a power base, his rule will be at risk and so will the 
legacy of the sitting ruler.
7
  
The selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita, et al (2003) which focuses on the support 
that a leader receives from the members of the society with the right to select the political 
leader implies an additional reason why the ruling class around the royal family may 
favour hereditary kingship. An incumbent ruler cannot credibly promise that his 
supporters will still receive private benefits after his death. This diminishes the 
incumbency advantage of the ruler increasing the likelihood of his forced removal from 
office before his death (and that infirmity or death of the ruler may be kept secret for as 
long as possible). However, when the office is hereditary, the ruling coalition knows who 
will inherit the crown and this problem is less acute. 
An additional argument in support of hereditary office is that the offspring of the sitting 
ruler, whose job involves several idiosyncratic and context–specific elements, may be 
best placed to succeed by virtue of familiarity and training for the profession from an 
early age. On this account, hereditary succession is a rational response to the risk that an 
outsider without the relevant knowledge occupies office.  
                                                 
6
 There are a few contemporary examples of dynastic succession in dictatorships: North 
Korea since 1953 is a case of a three–generation dictatorship by the Kim family. Examples of 
two–generation dictatorships are the Somoza family in Nicaragua, 1937–79 (father and then two 
sons); the Duvalier family in Haiti, 1956–86; the current dictatorships of the Assad family in 
Syria (since 1970) and the Aliyev family in Azerbaijan (since 1993), while in Cuba Fidel Castro, 
dictator since 1959, transferred power to his brother Raul in 2008.  
7
 See Zhang (2011) for a recent discussion and an application to communist China. 
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However, hereditary succession is exposed to the risk of genetic shocks, where the 
descendants of the sovereign have different talents and tastes from the founder of the 
dynasty, less suited to the throne.
8
 In addition, monarchy may suffer from a moral hazard 
problem. Kings occupying office for life and royal princes assured of inheriting the 
throne may have a limited incentive to develop the expertise required for discharging the 
duties of the post and spend their time pursuing their personal interests to the detriment of 
the state. This turns on its head the argument that monarchs take a long–run view of the 
interests of the nation. Moreover, liberal arguments regarding equality of opportunity, 
and equal political and legal rights, imply that the legitimacy of the office holder is 
predicated on the consent of the governed as expressed in elections and not through birth 
rights or other privileges, and reject hereditary succession. Similarly, the status and the 
role of the nobility that surrounds the royal family also raise questions about equality. 
2.2 Constitutional monarchy and the gains from division of labour 
Nevertheless, the arguments surveyed above relate to a monarch with the power to rule a 
country rather than a constitutional monarch heading a democratically governed country. 
In the latter setting, the best argument to justify the hereditary principle is a “negative 
one” (McLean, 2010), namely, to de–politicize the gains from division of labour between 
the head of state and other offices of government. The head of state performs three types 
of functions which are distinct from the acts of government; namely, constitutional, 
ceremonial and symbol of the nation functions (Bogdanor, 1996)
9
. These roles can be 
                                                 
8
 Walter Bagehot (1873), the English constitutionalist and essayist, aptly captures the 
problem: “It is idle to expect an ordinary man born in the purple to have greater genius than an 
extraordinary man born out of the purple; to expect a man whose place has always been fixed to 
have a better judgment than one who has lived by his judgment; to expect a man whose career 
will be the same whether he is discreet or whether he is indiscreet to have the nice discretion of 
one who has risen by his wisdom, who will fall if he ceases to be wise. The characteristic 
advantage of a constitutional king is the permanence of his place. This gives him the opportunity 
of acquiring a consecutive knowledge of complex transactions, but it gives only an opportunity. 
The king must use it... Yet a constitutional prince is the man who is most tempted to pleasure, and 
the least forced to business... Why should he work?” (p.91) 
9
 The gains from division of labour were first pointed out by Bagehot (1873), who saw 
the constitution as having “… two parts … first, those which excite and preserve the reverence of 
the population — the dignified parts, if I may so call them; and next, the efficient parts — those 
by which it, in fact, works and rules” (p.44)…The Queen is only at the head of the dignified part 
of the constitution. The prime minister is at the head of the efficient part.” (p. 48). He famously 
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performed by either a constitutional monarch or a president, that is, an ordinary citizen 
serving for a limited term ultimately accountable to the electorate instead of occupying 
office because of accident of birth. 
The constitutional role includes tasks like dissolving the parliament, within prescribed 
circumstances, and appointing the prime minister. The ceremonial duties may be of less 
political importance in present times but historically they were not devoid of value as 
they signaled the importance of state power where, according to Bagehot (1873), the 
monarchy represented government to the masses in its dignified, theatrical form. With 
respect to the symbol of the nation, a hereditary head of state may command broader 
allegiance as a non–politicized symbol of the nation who acts as a unifying force.10  
Nevertheless, there is no a priori reason to suppose that a hereditary king is better placed 
to perform the above functions. The constitutional role of the head of the state has 
obvious political implications and may be controversial; an elected head of state may 
enjoy higher legitimacy on this account.
11
 A hereditary king who does not emerge from a 
partisan and divisive election fits well the requirement of acting as a unifying symbolic 
figure, but so does a president elected by a super–majority. Royalists keen to preserve the 
tradition may argue that constitutional monarchy has served their nations well and if 
something is not broken there is no reason to fix it. Republicans may retort that its 
preservation goes against the grain of equality of opportunity. 
3 Democratic transition 
                                                                                                                                                 
identified three rights in the British monarchy: “the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, 
the right to warn. And a king of great sense and sagacity would want no others. He would find 
that his having no others would enable him to use these with singular effect.” (p. 85). 
10
 When a single person combines both the positions of the head of state and head of 
government (as in the USA) he may no longer be able to represent all of the people, but only the 
section who support him politically. Other means, like the national flag, may then serve as 
symbols of the nation.  
11
 Contemporary advocates of monarchy, like Kuehnelt–Leddihn (1956), Hoppe (1995) 
and Yeager (2011), also claim that a monarch is insulated from the hustle and bustle of day–to–
day politics, adopts a longer time horizon than elected politicians, can successfully resist demands 
by special interests, safeguards against abuses and protects minorities against majorities by 
retaining certain constitutional powers or denying them to others, and represents continuity. 
These authors argue that constitutional monarchy can better preserve people’s freedom and 
opportunities than democracy which has led to the increase in state power. However, such claims 
connote a monarch with political power instead of a neutral constitutional actor. 
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Political economy research on democratization has focused on how and why an 
autocracy, implicitly or explicitly headed by a monarch, changes to democracy. It is not 
the intention of this study to review this stock of work.
12
 More modestly, it focuses on 
three recent and most influential lines of thought on the emergence of democracy, 
namely, conflict between the elite and the disenfranchised poor by Acemoglu and 
Robinson, intra–elite conflicts by North, Wallis and Weingast, and constitutional 
exchanges and suffrage reform by Congleton. Although none of those works deals 
explicitly with the question of why in some transitions monarchy survives but not in 
others, various inferences can be made.   
3.1 Revolution and franchise extension 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and (2006) consider the shift from autocracy to 
democracy as the outcome of a conflict between a rich elite and a disenfranchised 
majority of poor citizens. Initially, government by the rich elite excludes the poor 
majority of citizens. In an attempt to improve their wellbeing, the poor may revolt and 
redistribute the assets of the elite to themselves. In order to prevent the threat of 
revolution, the elite may repress the majority or promise concessions, but when the 
resource cost of repression is high, the elite may promise redistribution policies that 
benefit the poor. However, such promises lack credibility: after the risk of revolution 
passes, the elite will cancel the redistribution measures. Realizing that the promised 
policies will be reversed, the poor majority has no incentive to accept them and revolts. 
Promises of redistribution lack credibility because the elite retain policy making power. If 
on the other hand the elite grant political rights allowing the majority to decide policy, as 
in a democracy, the majority passes the policies that will benefit its members. Democracy 
therefore is a credible commitment to majoritarian policies that benefit the poor and 
avoids the risk of revolutions. Acemoglu and Robinson show that democracy is 
established when income inequality is high enough to lead the disenfranchised majority 
to revolution, but not so high to imply large scale redistribution that would make the elite 
better off by repressing the poor (by engineering coups and instituting dictatorship to 
prevent redistribution). As a corollary, the political institutions adopted in a democracy 
                                                 
12
 See Coll (2008) for an overview and synthesis. 
 8 
are influenced by, amongst other factors, the power of the elites before democracy and 
their ability to manipulate the form of democracy, like the electoral rule and various 
constraints on the policy making power of the government.
13
  
This account of democratization focuses on the threat of revolution and has nothing to 
say about retaining a constitutional monarch or selecting a president. However, one may 
infer that the monarchy may be retained as part of a negotiated settlement, if the elite see 
its maintenance as a credible guarantee against extreme policies, or may be swept away 
by a revolution if the king fails to commit to a non political role. 
3.2 From elite privileges to impersonal rights 
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) focus on the role of intra–elite conflicts to explain 
democratization.
 
First, they distinguish between limited access social orders, or natural 
states (in all history up to the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries, p.164), and open access 
orders which achieved democracy and sustained economic prosperity. In the limited 
access order personal relationships, who one is and who one knows, form the basis of 
social organization. In open access orders impersonal categories of individuals interact 
anonymously to form economic, political and social relations. For a natural state to 
transform to open access it is necessary to credibly commit to the rule of law, set up 
perpetually lived public and private organizations that live beyond the natural lives of 
their individual members and engage in impersonal exchanges, and to consolidate control 
of the military.
14
 Open access is established when the elites transform their privileges to 
impersonal rights enjoyed by all because this way their privileges are more secure. It 
emerges as a solution to the problem of structuring relationships within the dominant 
coalition to ensure order. The “first movers” in this process were Britain, France and the 
USA in the nineteenth century. Despite different historical  origins, economic 
                                                 
13
 For recent extensions and refinements of the thesis that democracy results from the 
conflict between the rich elite and disenfranchised groups of middle and poorer classes see Ansell 
and Samuels (2014) and Boix (2015). 
14
 North and Weingast (1989) provide a most–often quoted example of how after the 
1688 Glorious Revolution, the British state made itself a perpetual organization when it provided 
secure credible commitments to repay debts by locating the liability for the debts in the “king–in–
parliament.” The “king–in–parliament” is a perpetually lived organization that lives beyond the 
physical lives of the members of the royal dynasty. 
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circumstances and political developments they displayed a common pattern of opening 
political and economic access, registering voters, forming political parties to contest 
elections and coordinate political activity in parliament, and loosening government 
restrictions on the freedom to form profit seeking corporations.  In the process, they also 
transformed the identity of the ruler from a powerful individual into an impersonal office. 
By being perpetually lived these institutions and organizations they also bind future rulers 
resolving thus commitment problems.  
As it is the case with the theory of democratization through revolution, there is no explicit 
consideration of the preservation or rejection of monarchy in this line of thought either. 
The predictions of the theory for its survival are unclear: hereditary monarchy which 
restricts access to the office of the head of state by birth rights contradicts the essence of 
open access and thus it will be deposed as in France. On the other hand, given that in a 
constitutional monarchy the king does not govern, his presence does not violate the spirit 
of open access and the monarchy will be preserved as in England.  
3.3 Constitutional exchanges and suffrage reform 
Contrary to the above authors, in his exploration of democratization Congleton (2001), 
(2007) and (2011) explicitly recognizes the king as a distinct actor in the policy making 
game played in a “king–and–council” template, where responsibilities for deciding 
policies are divided between a single person, the king (whose powers vary from agenda 
setting to veto to no decision making power) and a committee or council of noblemen 
advising the king.
15
 Congleton sees democratization as consisting of two complementary 
components, the transfer of policy making powers from the king to the parliament and the 
extension of voting rights to poorer classes of the population resulting in the parliament 
becoming representative of the citizenry. He analyzes the reassignment of powers as the 
result of piecemeal and peaceful bargains between the king and other actors operating 
within the existing legal framework, where the king trades policymaking authority to 
                                                 
15
 In accordance with the logic of the gains from division of labour, Congleton (2013) 
shows that division of authority over policy between different government bodies (where more 
than one actor has influence over policy) is inevitable, because no single actor can carry out 
successfully the responsibilities of initiating, passing, enacting and enforcing legislation. 
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parliament in exchange for new tax revenues when demands for revenues increase and 
when the anticipated costs of those changes decrease, without revolutionary threats. One 
of the several dimensions of authority negotiated between the king and the parliament 
was the power to appoint ministers (Congleton, 2015). Such constitutional exchanges are 
most likely during unsettled economic, political and social circumstances as in the late 
18
th
 century and afterwards, at a time of unprecedented scientific discovery, technological 
change, industrialization, urbanization and new intellectual currents. Further, suffrage 
changed slowly and only after the decisive voter and those elected to office expected 
tangible net benefits from giving up their privileged positions to the disenfranchised.
16
 
Congleton demonstrates that the constitutional exchanges explanation of the 
establishment of parliamentary democracy is consistent with the constitutional histories 
of the constitutional monarchies of the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and perhaps 
surprisingly, Germany up to and including the Weimar Republic, pre–WWII Japan, and 
the USA, so that the process was neither a purely European phenomenon nor irreversible. 
He also notes that revolutions which more often than not are accompanied by widespread 
violence, do not establish democratic governments.  
Although Congleton’s main interest is to explain how an elected parliament came to 
dominate policy making instead of the king, the question of why the monarchy survived 
in some transitions but not in others is not raised. His work illustrates the benefits from 
dividing authority over policy making between various office holders, but it does not 
explain why one of the actors retains hereditary rights to the office of head of state. One 
may nevertheless infer that in his account, the crown survives because the king made 
sufficient concessions in negotiating the constitutional settlement. Effectively, an implicit 
bargain is struck where the king gives up policy making powers but in return he keeps a 
ceremonial job as head of state, his palaces and, inevitably, some powers of patronage. 
Equally, the opposition to the king is satisfied with the policy making powers it has 
wrestled from the crown and no longer pursues its removal. 
 
                                                 
16
 Demands for suffrage reform were pursued by interest groups engaging in franchise 
reform, by political groups expecting to gain the support of newly enfranchised voters, and 
industrialists and workers who were under–represented in the earlier parliaments. 
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4 The fall and survival of the monarchy 
Today, out of 194 independent states, 86 started statehood as monarchies; they are all 
listed in Table 1.
17
 42 out of the 86 states are still headed by a monarch, with 26 of them 
ranked as “free” by the Freedom House in 2013; these are constitutional monarchies. On 
the other hand, 19 of the 44 countries that rejected monarchy are now democracies 
(“free” according to Freedom House) although not so at the time of the overthrow of the 
monarchy; the remaining 25 are autocracies. Table 1 also describes the reasons for the 
fall of the monarchy for each one of the 44 countries (as well as England in 1649 and 
Spain in 1873 and 1931). Those causes are divided between proximate and fundamental. 
The proximate causes describe the circumstance that led to the end of monarchical rule. 
They include (1) Military defeat after a major war. (2) Dissolution of the monarchical 
state as a result of military defeat where the authorities of the successor states set up 
republican constitutions, or of decolonization. (3) Coups and revolutions against the 
monarchical regime. (4) A referendum to approve the new constitutional settlement. 
Often, more than one of those factors were present at the same time and worked in 
tandem. Fundamental causes are those that explain why the proximate factors resulted in 
the overthrow of the monarchy and relate to (1) failure of the monarch to preserve 
national unity and act as a symbol of it, and (2) failure of the monarch to share policy 
making powers with political groups that demanded such powers.  
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 As noted by an anonymous referee, a number of the monarchical states listed on the 
Table emerged as the result of “fusion” and further conquest of territories ruled by royal houses 
established as far back as the medieval times. The Habsburgs ruled over large swathes of territory 
covering modern Austria, Hungary, Czech, Slovak, and Polish and Balkan lands. Italy emerged in 
1861 under the House of Savoy by including amongst others the kingdom of Piedmont–Sardinia 
(ruled by the Savoy dynasty), the kingdom of Naples and Sicily and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. 
Imperial Germany–Prussia is even more complicated as in addition to Prussia it included the 
sovereign kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony and Wurttemberg, a number of duchies, principalities 
and free cities. Nor was this pattern of state formation a purely European phenomenon; for 
example Saudi Arabia was formed after successful conquests by the long–standing ruling 
dynasty. On the other hand, Poland is excluded from the list because, although it was a kingdom 
until the third partition in 1795, it was a republic in the post–1918 settlement on independence. So 
is Ireland, which was a part of the United Kingdom ruled from London until 1922 and became a 
fully independent republic in 1949. The analysis also excludes other medieval and early modern 
kingdoms, indigenous tribal kingdoms outside Europe pre–existing European colonial conquests 
and states that were founded as republics. 
Table 1: LIST OF SURVIVING AND DEPOSED MONARCHIES 
Surviving Monarchies   Deposed Monarchies  Period of 
Monarchy 
Fall of monarchy as a result of  
Antigua & Barbuda1  * Afghanistan 1919 –1973 Military coup  
Australia1  * Albania 1920– 1939 War Defeat after Italian invasion  
Bahamas1  * Austria – Habsburg  1526 –1918  World War I Defeat; Dissolution  * 
Bahrain  Brazil  1822–1889  Military coup * 
Barbados1  * Bulgaria  1908 –1946  World War II Defeat  * 
Belgium  * Burundi 1962 –1966  Military coup  
Belize1  * China 1644–1911  Revolution  
Bhutan   Egypt 1922–1952  Revolution  
Brunei  England 1050–1649 Revolution; Civil War Defeat  
Cambodia   Ethiopia 1855–1974  Revolution  
Canada1  * Fiji # 1970–1987  Decolonization from Britain  
Denmark  * France   – Bourbon Monarchy 
              –  First Empire 
              –  Bourbon restored 
              –  Second Empire                                                   
1589–1792 
1804–1815  
1815–1848  
1852–1870 
1789 Revolution  
1815 War Defeat  
1848 Revolution  
1870 War Defeat 
* 
Grenada1  * 
Jamaica1  * 
Japan  * 
Jordan  Gambia # 1965–1970  Decolonization from Britain; Referendum  
Kuwait  Germany–Prussia  1871–1918  World War I Defeat; Dissolution * 
Lesotho  * Ghana # 1957–1960  Decolonization from Britain; Referendum * 
Liechtenstein  * Greece  – Monarchy 
         – Monarchy 
1832–1924  
1935–1974  
1921 War Defeat by Turkey 
Referendum 
* 
Luxembourg  * 
Malaysia2  Guyana # 1966–1970  Decolonization from Britain  * 
Monaco  * Haiti 1804–1806 Military coup  
Morocco   Hungary–Habsburg  1526–1918 
1919 
1920  
World War I Defeat; Dissolution,   
Communist takeover 
Assembly proclaimed kingdom under regent 
* 
Netherlands       * 
New Zealand1  * 
Norway     * Iceland  1660–1940  Referendum on independence from Denmark * 
Oman   Iran 1501–1979 Revolution; Referendum  
Papua New Guinea1  Iraq 1932–1958  Revolution  
Qatar  Italy  1861–1946  1945 War Defeat; Referendum * 
St Kits and Nevis1  * Kenya # 1963–1964  Decolonization from Britain  
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St Lucia1  * Laos 1954–1975  Revolution   
St Vincent & the Grenadines1  * Libya 1951–1969  Military coup  
Saudi Arabia  Malawi #  1964–1966 Decolonization from Britain  
Solomon Islands1  Maldives 1965–1968  Referendum  
Spain  * Malta # 1964–1974  Decolonization from Britain; Referendum * 
Swaziland  Mauritius # 1968–1992  Decolonization from Britain * 
Sweden  * Mexico  1821–1823  Revolution  
Thailand  Montenegro  1878–1918  Revolution, becomes part of Yugoslavia * 
Tonga  * Nepal 1768–2007  Revolution  
Tuvalu1  * Nigeria # 1960–1963  Decolonization from Britain  
United Arab Emirates 3  Portugal            1640–1910  Revolution * 
United Kingdom  * Romania  1878–1947  World War II Defeat  * 
 Russia 1613–1917  World War I Defeat; Dissolution; Revolution   
Samoa  1962–2007  Monarchy abolished 4 * 
Serbia – Yugoslavia 5  1878–1945 World War II Defeat * 
Sierra Leone # 1961–1971 Decolonization from Britain  
Spain  
 
1526–1873 
1874–1931 
Revolution 
Antimonarchical election result 
 
Sri Lanka # 1948–1972  Decolonization from Britain   
Trinidad & Tobago # 1962–1976  Decolonization from Britain * 
Tunisia 1956–1957  Revolution  
Turkey–Ottoman  1383–1922  World War I Defeat; Dissolution; Revolution  
Yemen (North) 1918–1962  Military coup  
Notes on Table 1: 
 
 #: The first date in the  period monarchy column refers to the date of independence from Britain 
*: Classified as “Free” in 2013 by the Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org; a Free country is one where there is open political competition, a 
climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media.   
1
: Independent Commonwealth states that recognize Queen Elizabeth II of England as their titular sovereign 
2
: Under Malaysia's rotational monarchy, the heads of each of the nine hereditary states occupy the throne for five years 
3
: The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven monarchical states and is governed by a Supreme Council of Rulers made up of the seven 
emirs, who appoint the prime minister and the cabinet 
4
:  Monarchy abolished  upon the death of King Malietoa Tanumafili who had been appointed king for life at independence in 1962 
5
: Yugoslavia was established as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918, under the Serbian king 
Sources: See Appendix  
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Table 1 chronicles 14 military defeats, 5 dissolutions, 17 revolutions, 6 coups, 12 instances of 
decolonization and 8 referendums as the occasions leading to the demise of the monarchy. 
Greece in 1974 is the only case where a referendum was held without either prior war defeat, or 
dissolution or revolution. The Appendix offers a brief account of the fall of monarchy in 29 
selected states and its survival in England and Spain. The historical narrative illustrates that 
deposing the monarchical order may be a long–drawn process with swings from monarchy to 
republic and back again. 
4.1 Military defeat and dissolution of the state  
Prussia, the Dual Monarchy of Austria and Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire after WWI 
are the best known examples of the demise of the monarchy as a result of combinations of defeat 
in war, dissolution of a multi–ethnic state and revolution against the prewar political and social 
order, even though the sequence of events differs from country to country. In Prussia, the 
abdication of the Kaiser after defeat was followed by revolutionary actions that were quelled by 
an alliance of socialists and the remnants of the military. In Austria and Hungary the emperor 
abdicated from both crowns and the respective assemblies proclaimed republics. Debited with 
defeat the Russian Tsar abdicated; a republic was set up which eventually succumbed to 
communist rule that consolidated after fighting a civil war. After defeat, the Ottoman lands were 
carved between the victors but the settlement was opposed by a nationalist movement which 
abolished the sultanate and after further fighting against Greece it secured sovereign control over 
Asia Minor. Similarly, the Greek monarchy was deposed after a military revolt that followed the 
1922 defeat in the hands of Turkey which was blamed on the king and the pro–royal government 
(although the republic was short lived, see the Appendix).  
Bulgaria, Italy, Romania and Yugoslavia–Serbia demonstrate the demise of monarchy after 
defeat in WWII. It is worth noting that in addition to losing the war, the kings of all four 
countries either directly or indirectly supported authoritarian–fascist governments during the 
interwar period. Arguably, such political biases contributed to a popular feeling against their 
continued presence in the post war constitutional order. Moreover, in Bulgaria and Romania the 
Soviet Red Army in its pursuit of the German forces in WWII assisted the local anti–royalist 
communists to prevail against their local liberal and conservative rivals. Although the Red Army 
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did not enter Yugoslavia, a strong local communist party that was instrumental in the resistance 
against the occupying German forces overthrew the monarchy. It is also worth noting that 
Bulgaria and Romania (along with Greece), countries that won independence from the Ottomans 
in the nineteenth century, lacked domestic birth aristocracies and royal families. As a result their 
kings were appointed from the members of foreign royal houses who in turn could not rely on 
the support by local nobilities. In Italy, the monarchy was deposed after a referendum was held 
in 1946, where 54% of the electorate voted for republic.  
However even taking into account the ferocity of the two world wars, it is not immediately 
obvious why defeat in war would lead to the overthrow of the monarchy (assuming of course 
that it is not the victor who ousts the king of the defeated state and dictates a republican 
dispensation). Pre–20th century European history is littered with examples of countries that lost 
wars but the defeated king did not lose his crown. Going further back to the past, loss in war 
often led to a change in dynasty but not to the institution of monarchy. As it is explained below, 
more fundamental factors must be at work.  
The preservation of monarchy in Japan after WWII appears as an outlier of the above narrative. 
It should be noted however, that it was General MacArthur of the victorious American forces 
that decided to preserve the Emperor and introduce constitutional monarchy as a way to maintain 
social order by supporting Japanese liberals to reform the Meiji constitution that had been 
introduced before militarism dominated policy making in the 1930s (see Congleton 2011 for 
details).  
4.2 Decolonization  
A number of countries after gaining independence from Britain, the colonial ruler, became 
members of the Commonwealth and kept the Queen of England represented by a Governor–
General as their titular head of states. Within a few years after independence, the governments of 
some of those countries chose a republican constitutional order, a change that was often 
approved by holding a referendum. These are shown in Table 1 as being monarchies from the 
year of independence to the year of proclaiming republic (states that were founded as republics, 
like the USA, South American republics, Pakistan and India and so on, are outside the scope of 
 16 
the present study). Rejection of monarchy by the rulers of a new state emerging after 
decolonization is common and somehow not a surprising choice after an often violent struggle 
for emancipation and national liberation. But it is by no means the only option. A number of 
British ex–colonies chose to retain the Queen of England as the titular head of state after gaining 
independence. These include three “big” countries in terms of population and per capita GDP, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, as well as a number of small ‘island–nations’, some of 
which number fewer than half a million citizens. Large numbers of original British settlers and a 
desire to preserve cultural ties with Britain may explain such choices, along with the aims to 
avert internal political divisions from selecting a political head of state and to avoid the costs of 
the office of the head of state (especially for the smaller nations).   
4.3 Revolutions and coups 
Berger and Spoerer (2001) define revolutions as occasions characterized by “(i) the use of 
violence, or the credible threat thereof, in an effort to change the political system; and (ii) 
collective action, that is, active involvement of “the crowd” in that effort” (p. 295–296). A coup 
d'état is the seizure of power by the military or factions of it. Sometimes, as in the case of 
nationalist army officers overthrowing a ruler backed by a foreign ex–colonial power, coups 
enjoy sufficient support to be considered as representing social movements and effectively 
amounting to revolutions. Revolutions and coups that enjoy popular support often led to the 
repudiation of the monarchy and radical changes in government. As already explained some 
revolutions against the crown were associated with the aftermath of defeat in war or 
decolonization. In other cases, revolutions related to a host of factors linked primarily to 
domestic political disputes. The latter often originated from adverse economic circumstances for 
large groups of the population, corrupt and incompetent government, refusal of autocratic rulers 
to satisfy popular demands for political reform and policy changes, and ideological objectives.  
In France, the 1789 Revolution first led to a constitutional monarchy, but failure of the king to 
abide was followed by the execution of the royal family, the administration of the “Great Terror” 
(1792), the Directory (1795), which was overthrown by Napoleon (1799), who crowned himself 
emperor (1804). After his defeat in 1815, the Bourbon dynasty was restored, but was overthrown 
in the 1848 Revolution; the new republic was in turn overthrown by Louis–Napoleon Bonaparte 
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(nephew of Napoleon I) who in 1852 established himself as emperor; he was defeated against the 
Prussians in 1870. A republican constitution came into effect in 1875.  
During the twentieth century several monarchies yielded to coups and revolutions. In Portugal, 
in a background of economic crisis, social unrest and a wave of republicanism, a military revolt 
supported by urban lower classes deposed the monarchy in 1910. Democratic politics were 
short–lived as a coup in 1926 established a dictatorship (overthrown in 1974). The Chinese 
emperor was deposed in 1911 after a military revolt by officers aiming to reform internal politics 
and Chinese foreign relations. The country then became prey to provincial military leaders 
fighting for control. After 1925 nationalists were fighting against communists who eventually 
prevailed in 1949 under the leadership of Mao Zedong. In Egypt, a coup by the "Free Officers' 
Movement" deposed King Farouk in 1952 and proclaimed the country a republic in 1953. In Iraq 
the monarchy was overthrown in 1958 after a military coup amid a wave of Arab nationalism in 
the Middle East. The Tunisian monarchy was overthrown in 1957 by the prime minister who had 
led the campaign for independence from France. In North Yemen army officers seized power 
and deposed the king in 1962 igniting civil war. In Libya, an independent kingdom since 1951, 
King Idris was deposed in a 1969 coup by Colonel Gaddafi. In 1974 the Emperor of Ethiopia, 
Haile Selassie, was overthrown in a military coup. A coup in 1973 brought down the Afghani 
monarchy. After winning a civil war, the communist party of Laos forced the king to abdicate in 
1975. In 1979 the Shah of Iran fled the country following violent protests against his regime; 
Ayatollah Khomeini, a religious leader, returned to Iran from exile. After a referendum Iran was 
declared an Islamic Republic. In Nepal where Maoist insurgents had been fighting a violent 
campaign against the monarchy, the parliament abolished the monarchy as part of a peace deal 
with the Maoist party to join the government in 2007, although internal peace and political 
stability remained elusive.  
De Jouvenel (1948) explains succinctly the removal of the king in the context of the French 
Revolution of 1789: The revolution acts as the mandatory of the national will, which is the 
source of all authority. The king can be retained only if he is also a representative of the national 
will. But this leads to the contradiction that there are simultaneously elective and hereditary 
representatives. The king is then reduced into a "no more than first functionary". If so, there is no 
reason for the functionary to be in his post permanently, and he is removed. Although after 
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WWII the repudiation of the monarchy was championed by socialist and communist groups, 
demand for radical change was often more general, as the pre–war ruling classes were held 
responsible for policies that led to defeat, and some of their members were also seen as willing 
to collaborate with the Germans (see Gilbert and Clay Large, 2002).   
However, not all revolutions overthrew the monarchy, nor did revolutions establish democracy. 
The English Glorious Revolution of 1688 replaced one king, James II, with another, William and 
Mary. Rather than abolishing the monarchy, the key institutional changes included the English 
Bill of Rights formally agreed between the crown and the parliament, and that parliamentary 
consent was necessary for the king to raise tax revenues and maintain a standing army during 
peacetime. Similarly and unlike France, in 1848 a wave of revolts in German lands, Austria – 
Hungary and Italian lands did not overthrow the respective hereditary rulers but forced them to 
concede constitutions. 
18
 
From the information presented above it is clear that none of the revolutions and coups that 
dethroned the monarchs led to democracy; instead, their leaders established autocratic rules. The 
countries that democratized did so slowly and gradually building on previous steps. Similarly, 
leaders of nationalist movements that prevail after decolonization often establish one–party rule. 
As Congleton (2011) made plain, the reason is that successful revolutionary leaders are reluctant 
to subject their power to the vagaries of elections. Specifically, revolutionaries confront a severe 
collective action problem: A rational individual realizes that participating in a revolution is 
costly, for not only has he to commit resources, but also risks arrest by the security service, and 
possible injury or death in an uprising. He also understands that if the revolution succeeds, he 
will not be excluded from the benefits that the new regime provides (Tullock, 1987); he is then 
better off by free–riding. Thus, obedience to the autocrat is the Nash equilibrium of a prisoner’s 
dilemma faced by his subjects (civilians and soldiers) who would like to overthrow him, but 
none revolts. This implies that a rational revolutionary requires additional private incentives, like 
appointment to office, monetary rewards and so on, to participate in the uprising.
19
 Successful 
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 For an analysis of the economic forces behind the 1848 Revolutions and the nexus between 
revolution and the then political institutions in various countries, see Berger and Spoerer (2001). 
19
 See Grossman (1991) for a rational choice model of revolutions and Mueller (2003) for a 
review. Olsson-Yaouzis (2012) shows that revolutions are more likely to break out when a ruler has lost 
the opportunity to intervene against the revolutionaries at an early stage of the uprising before a critical 
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revolutionaries are then more likely to preserve the hierarchy, secrecy and discipline of the 
revolutionary organization, and reward their loyal collaborators and supporters, instead of 
risking election defeat and loss of the benefits from office. This implies that the replacement of a 
king by an autocrat (a military officer, or a civilian) does not end the monarchy, but replaces a 
hereditary ruler with a new one–man–rule. The dictator may then consolidate his hold of office 
as president for life, or may be overthrown in a coup by another strongman from inside the 
ruling circle.
20
  
It is also important to explain the observed pattern where a mass mobilization like a revolution 
that overthrows the monarchy occurs after a defeat in war. Two complementary reasons seem to 
be at work here. The first is that an event such as the defeat in war may offer an opportune 
moment to the amorphous mass of citizens to resolve the collective action problem and allow 
them to coordinate their actions as expressed in a revolution. Mobilizing an army brings together 
a large number of men greatly reducing the costs of communication and coordination of 
activities that may be directed against a ruler that lost the war. For civilians too, defeat may 
keynote the moment when a rational actor believes that he becomes the pivotal player (Palfrey 
and Rosenthal, 1984), so that he participates in the revolution for otherwise the revolution fails. 
Second, independently of the collective action issue, defeat in war is indicative of a monarch’s 
military weakness. As a result, anti–royalists may calculate that their chances to prevail in a 
conflict are higher and pursue the violent overthrow of the regime. The reverse is of course true 
for monarchs that emerge victorious from war.  
4.4 Referendums 
As described in Table 1 and the Appendix, referendums are often used to legitimize the abolition 
of monarchy or its retention. As already said, the Greek referendum of 1974 stands out for it 
deposed the monarchy without a previous defeat in war or revolution. Greece was on the 
winning side of WWII, but after the Germans left a bitter civil war broke out between the 
                                                                                                                                                             
mass of citizens has turned against him and / or when the ruler has failed to punish the revolutionaries 
severely. 
20
 See Wintrobe (1998) for a discussion of the “Dictator's Dilemma” facing any ruler, that is,  to 
know how much support he has among the general population, and smaller groups with the ability to 
overthrow him. 
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nationalists and the communists won by the former in 1949. In the period that followed the king 
sometimes interfered in politics transgressing the constitutional limits of his authority. His stance 
towards the military coup of 1967 was ambivalent, first not condemning it, then organizing a 
countercoup and fleeing the country when the latter failed. After the collapse of the dictatorship 
in 1974, a referendum was held that returned a 67% vote in favour of republic.  
On the other hand, the Belgian referendum of 1950 is an example of a referendum that retained 
the monarchy. King Leopold III of Belgium, as supreme commander of the army, surrendered 
unconditionally to Nazi Germany in WWII against the wishes of his cabinet. Leopold was held 
prisoner by the Germans near Brussels until 1944 and then in Austria to the end of the war. In 
1950 a referendum was held that recorded a 57% vote for the return of the king. The referendum 
was followed by strikes and riots, so Leopold abdicated in 1951 in favour of his son. 
4.5 Fundamental causes of the fall of monarchy 
Nevertheless, to acknowledge that the monarchy was overthrown because a state lost a war, or 
new states emerged after the war, or a successful revolution set up a new regime, does not 
explain why the new constitutional dispensation repudiated the monarchy. Deeper, more 
fundamental, factors must be at work, so that when the occasion of war defeat and so on arises, 
the monarchy is abolished. The fundamental cause for deposing the monarchy is that it is no 
longer considered as a legitimate system of government, so that the reason for its existence 
disappears. Two such fundamental causes seem to be in operation, namely, failure of the 
monarch to secure national unity and failure to share policy making powers. Either one of them 
or both are at the root of the abolition of monarchy. Note that such fundamental causes do not 
inquire why wars, state dissolutions or revolutions break out; they explain why these occasions 
lead to the fall of monarchy.  
Defeat in war and breakup of the country sometimes followed by population transfer and 
resettlement of internal refugees signify the failure of the king to secure the integrity of the state 
and to symbolize national unity. If protection against an external threat is a core duty of the head 
of state (McLean, 2010) defeat and disintegration undermine fatally its very existence. In the 
nineteenth century the birth of the nation–state, where the state belongs to the nation identified 
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with the people and not to a royal dynasty, put at risk multi–ethnic monarchies, like the 
Habsburg Dual monarchy, Russia and the Ottoman empire, and later on the British and French 
colonial empires, from nationalist movements seeking independence and national statehood. 
This explains why the fall of the monarchy is mainly a twentieth century phenomenon (as well 
as why newly formed states were founded as republics). War defeat of ruling monarchs offered 
the opportunity for breaking free. On the contrary, the monarchy survived in European states 
allied to the winning side of the world wars (even in those that were occupied by the Nazis, like 
Luxembourg, Holland, Denmark and Norway), where the throne appeared as a symbol of 
national unity. In terms of game theory, the monarchy played the role of a focal (or Schelling) 
point around which people rallied.
21
  
The monarchy is also under threat when the king refuses to yield policy making power to 
political actors with an interest in public policy and the means, financial and otherwise, to pursue 
their claims. Such demands for a role in policy making typically arise when economic and social 
circumstances improve the relative strength of various groups, some already enfranchised others 
not yet, and when new ideological currents turn against aristocratic privileges. These conditions 
were satisfied during the industrial revolution. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
technological progress, expansion of trade and urbanization strengthened the bargaining power 
of the emerging middle and labour classes who then demanded a say in policy making in matters 
that affected their welfare. The monarchy survived in countries where the king entered 
constitutional negotiations, as explained by Congleton, which gradually led to his effective 
withdrawal from a politically active role. Although hereditary rulers did not bargain away their 
formal claim to authority, they evidently did so informally through negotiations with parliament, 
an exchange that secured the preservation of their dynasties, and the honors and privileges 
associated with the office of the head of state. As a corollary, the principle of appointment to 
public office by election appears to be less than absolute; it was in effect traded off against other 
desirable attributes, like preservation of the peace, especially when the removal of the dynasty 
implied violent conflict, and upholding of legality and application of due process. 
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 For similar arguments that the crown may provide a degree of social stability, easing tensions, 
and offering a role model to the society see Bjørnskov (2006) and Bjørnskov and Kurrild–Klitgaard 
(2014). 
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Obviously, the king’s promise not to engage in a political role must be credible, for otherwise 
bargains struck will not stick. Credibility is built when the king gives up control of vital 
institutions of government including the power to appoint the prime minister and other ministers. 
Specifically, instead of being chosen by the king, the cabinet must enjoy the confidence of the 
parliament.
22
 An additional step is that the king surrenders control of the military (although he 
may still hold ceremonial positions), so that it is recognized as a national organization rather 
than an instrument of royal dominance. In countries where democratization takes place, if the 
monarch is perceived as committed to the restricted role negotiated between him and other 
claimants typically working through the parliament, the constitutional and political reforms 
enacted are credible and the monarchy is retained as a constitutional monarchy. If, however, the 
monarch does not credibly commit to the democratic reforms, for example, by actively 
supporting anti–democratic elements, interfering with cabinet appointments, and otherwise 
violating the bargains made, the monarchy will not survive and a republican order will be 
established. Italy in 1946 and Greece in 1974 are two good examples here. Deposing the 
monarchy then acts as an evidently credible signal that the political order has changed. In the 
absence of democratization, violent contests for office between traditional elites, epitomized by 
the king, and new claimants seeking power, will not establish constitutional monarchy. Rather 
than adopting inclusive political institutions, whoever wins the conflict will maintain an 
autocratic system. It transpires that the likelihood of the survival of the monarchy varies directly 
with the degree of political interference of the king. The more a king meddles in government the 
fewer the chances that the monarchy survives.  
In the nineteenth and twentieth century, the ascendancy of a government accountable to a 
representative parliament rendered king’s grip on authority tenuous. According to Rose and 
Kavanagh (1976), a monarch who responded to a crisis unsuccessfully risked being overthrown; 
if he responded successfully, his authority increased but only temporarily that is until the next 
crisis. If he did not respond at all, his power dwindled and was taken by the politician who 
confronted the crisis. We then conclude that a kind of reversal of king’s fortune has taken place: 
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 Congleton (2015) examines the emergence of a new equilibrium where, instead of the king it 
was the elected chamber of parliament that controlled ministerial appointments, a change that took place 
gradually without formal constitutional reforms but built on earlier constitutional provisions. 
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Before the emergence of representative government, ministerial councils – cabinets served at the 
pleasure of the monarch. After democratically elected parliaments took control, monarchs in 
effect serve at the pleasure of parliamentary government. By refusing to share policy making 
power, monarchs risked losing both power and its trappings.  
5 Conclusions 
The present study was motivated by the observation that although liberal democracy has rejected 
birth privilege in appointment to public office, some modern democracies are still headed by a 
hereditary king, while others have adopted a republican form of state. Political economy has 
examined at length autocracy and the emergence of parliamentary government, but has ignored 
why in the transition to democracy some countries retained their kings as constitutional 
monarchs, some set up republican orders, while others replaced hereditary kings with dictators 
without bringing democracy. These issues were addressed here.  
After a review of arguments for and against a hereditary king and a selective survey of 
theoretical explanations of the rise of representative government, the paper focused on why 
kings may be deposed. The historical summary showed that starting from the nineteenth century 
and especially in the twentieth century a number of proximate causes led to the overthrow of 
monarchs, namely, military defeat blamed on the king and the aristocratic class around the 
crown, break up of an existing empire (including colonial powers) with its parts forming new 
independent states, and revolution. Often those factors were present simultaneously and fed back 
on each other. In some occasions new legislative bodies made the formal proclamations, in other 
cases republics were declared after referendums were held. It was also noted that the violent 
overthrow of the monarchy did not immediately bring democracy but replaced a dynastic 
crowned autocrat with a non–crowned dictator.  
Neither defeat nor dissolution nor revolution can ultimately explain the repudiation of the 
monarchy, so fundamental causes for its fall were sought. The end of hereditary rule was 
attributed to two failures of kings. First, the failure to secure the integrity of the state and act as a 
symbol of unity, a reason that explains the fall of monarchy after defeat in war against a foreign 
power and cessation of territories after a civil war or independence from a colonial power. 
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Second, the failure to concede policy making powers to other interested parties with the means 
to support their claims, a reason often found in peaceful and revolutionary challenges to royal 
authority. On the contrary, kings that projected themselves as symbols of national unity and 
kings that bargained in good faith with increasingly representative parliaments kept their crowns.  
 
Appendix: The fall of monarchy in selected states 
Afghanistan 
The Afghan monarchy, a constitutional monarchy since 1964, was overthrown in 1973 by a coup, whose 
leader declared a republic. He was in turn overthrown in 1979 pro–Soviet coup, which was followed by 
USSR invasion (1979) and then civil war.  
Albania  
In Albania, independent since 1919, the dominant politician Zogu dissolved the parliament and declared 
himself king in 1928. He and his family fled after Italy invaded in 1939. 
Brazil 
In 1822, the regent, son of the king of Portugal, declared independence from Portugal and crowned himself 
Emperor of Brazil. After he inherited the Portuguese throne in 1826, his son became emperor of Brazil. 
The monarchy was overthrown in 1889 by a military coup and a republic was proclaimed. 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria was defeated in WWI. As a result of the territorial losses suffered, King Ferdinand abdicated in 
favour of his son Boris. King Boris opposed the rise of the radical agrarian party and after a turbulent 
period of unstable parliamentary governments and nationalist coups in 1935 he established a dictatorial 
government. In WWII Bulgaria allied with the Axis. In September 1944, the Red Army entered Bulgaria, 
enabling the Bulgarian Communists to seize power and the monarchy was abolished in 1946. 
Burundi  
Burundi, previously occupied by Belgium, became an independent kingdom in 1962. The monarchy was 
abolished after a military coup in 1966, but interethnic violence has been endemic. 
China 
In 1911 military revolts by reform – minded officers ousted the Qing emperor and established the Republic 
of China in 1912. The latter failed to consolidate its rule because of wars between "warlords", provincial 
military leaders. In 1925 Chiang Kai–shek leader of the nationalist party broke off with the communists 
(his allies since 1923) in an attempt to control the entire country.  The communists under the leadership of 
Mao – Zedong embarked in the "Long March" to evade and regroup. Civil war between the two sides 
resumed after Japan's defeat in WWII. It ended in 1949 with the victory of the communists and Mao 
Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China, while the nationalists set up a 
government in the island of Taiwan.  
Egypt 
In Egypt, an independent kingdom since 1924, a coup by the "Free Officers' Movement" deposed King 
Farouk in 1952 and proclaimed the country a republic in 1953.  
England and Wales 
Following his defeat by the Parliament in the Civil War of 1642–49, King Charles I was executed and 
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England was declared a commonwealth. Oliver Cromwell, the commander of the army that defeated 
Charles, dismissed the rump (purged) parliament in 1653 and governed as Lord Protector until his death in 
1658. He was succeeded by his son, Richard whose authority soon collapsed and a newly elected 
parliament called for the restoration of the Stuart dynasty in 1660. Charles II (son of Charles I) returned to 
the throne and bequeathed the throne to his brother James II in 1685. James ruled without parliament and 
followed pro–catholic religion policies that intensified tensions with Anglicans. In 1688 several peers 
invited the Protestant William of Orange, member of a noble Dutch family, and his wife Mary, Protestant 
daughter of James II from his first wife, to invade England and oust James. After his army disintegrated 
without fighting James left the country. Early in 1689, the English Parliament formally offered William and 
Mary the throne as joint monarchs on condition of agreeing to the Bill of Rights which in addition to 
arrangements for royal succession to Protestants only, included a number of rights and liberties, the 
prohibition of taxation without the consent of the parliament and the call for regular parliaments. These 
events are known as the “Glorious Revolution”. 
Ethiopia 
In 1974 the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, was overthrown in a military coup. Thousands of 
government opponents died during the "Red Terror" under the Marxist dictatorship that followed.  
France  
The French Revolution broke out in 1789. The General Estates proclaimed constitutional monarchy in 1791 
and republic in 1792, while King Louis XVI and his family were executed in 1793. An administration of 
Great Terror descended in 1794, a new constitution establishing the Directory came in 1795, which is in 
turn was overthrown by Napoleon’s coup of 1799, who introduced authoritarian personal rule and had 
himself crowned as hereditary emperor in 1804. His reign ended in 1815 after defeat at Waterloo and the 
Bourbon dynasty was restored, but Charles X trying to rule by "the grace of God" instead of the consent of 
the people was forced to abdicate after an uprising in 1830. His successor, Louis–Philippe was overthrown 
by the 1848 Revolution which eventually set up the Second Republic; the latter lasted until 1851 when the 
elected president Louis–Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of Napoleon I, launched a coup and in 1852 
established himself as emperor Napoleon III. The Second Empire fell in 1870 after the defeat of France by 
the Prussians and the Third Republic was set up in a dramatic sequence of events: Peace with Prussia was 
followed by a brutal containment of the Parisian Commune costing more bloodshed than the 1789 
Revolution, a monarchist parliamentary majority, disarray and divisions inside the latter, and slow progress 
of republicanism, so that in 1875 the Assembly passed with a single vote the constitutional acts of the new 
republic that made the president electable by the Assembly and provided for a two–chamber legislature. 
Germany – Prussia  
Military defeat in WWI led to the formation of a new government which broke the hold of power by the 
aristocratic elite and initiated transition to parliamentary democracy. As the new government sued for 
peace, mutiny by the navy, demonstrations and revolutionary actions against the old leaders broke out. The 
Kaiser, Wilhelm II, abdicated on 9 November 1918, (two days before the armistice was signed) and a 
republic for Germany was proclaimed in Berlin. Fierce fighting then went on in various places in Germany 
amid deep divisions between extreme left organizations and the moderate majority of the socialist. The 
situation was brought under control by the alliance of the socialists and the military, agreed to preserve 
national unity, which defeated the revolutionaries. The government then called elections for a constituent 
assembly which in 1919 launched the (eventually doomed) Weimar Republic.  
Greece  
After defeat against a resurgent nationalist Turkey in 1922, which was blamed on the royalist government, 
King George II was expelled, and a republic was proclaimed. The latter beset by economic crisis and 
political instability lasted only until 1935 when following a failed putsch by anti–royalist officers, the 
elected pro–royalist government restored the monarchy and George II returned. A year later, and with the 
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agreement of the king dictatorship was imposed. George II fled during the Nazi occupation of the country 
to return in the midst of a vicious civil war between the nationalist and the communists. The civil war was 
won by the nationalists in 1949 and an authoritarian constitution came into effect in 1952. The 
constitutional order was broken by a military coup in 1967, when the king was seen as offering his tacit 
approval. After the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1974 a referendum was held where 69% of the 
voters supported a republic. The monarchy ended peacefully without war defeat or revolution. 
Habsburg Dual Monarchy of Austria and Hungary  
After defeat and loss of territory at the end of WWI, the Habsburg emperor Charles IV recognized the right 
of the peoples of Austria and Hungary to determine their constitutional order, although he did not officially 
abdicate. The Provisional National Assembly of Austria consisting of members of the imperial council 
from German speaking territories proclaimed a republic. In Hungary, after a successful uprising two weeks 
before the end of WWI, the new Hungarian government set up a republic, but as war defeat resulted in 
extensive territorial losses of Hungarian lands, the government collapsed and a communist controlled 
government took over in 1919. Popular support for the latter was short–lived. After failing to preserve the 
territorial integrity it lost power; the old ruling elite retook control. In March 1920 the newly elected 
assembly restored the monarchy under Admiral Miklos Horthy as regent. Following an unsuccessful 
military attempt of the Habsburgs to retake the throne in 1921, the dynasty was dethroned, although 
Hungary remained a monarchy until 1946 when under Soviet occupation the post–WWII communist 
dominated government declared a republic.  
Haiti 
Haiti, a French colony, became independent in 1804 with a former slave declaring himself emperor. Two 
years later he was assassinated from within his administration and a republic was proclaimed. 
Iceland 
In 1874 Iceland under the Danish crown was given autonomy over her internal affairs and full self– 
government in 1918, while Denmark retained control over foreign affairs. The Treaty of Union with 
Denmark ran out in 1943. In a 1944 referendum with a majority of 98% Iceland voted to become a 
republic.  
Iran 
In January 1979 the Shah of Iran fled the country following months of increasingly violent protests against 
his regime and his modernization policies. Ayatollah Khomeini, a religious leader coordinating religion–
inspired opposition, returned to Iran from exile. The army was unable to defend the old regime, and after a 
referendum Iran was declared an Islamic Republic.  
Iraq 
In Iraq, created as a kingdom in 1920 in the post WWI settlement and independent since 1932, the 
monarchy was overthrown in 1958 after a military coup amid a wave of Arab nationalism. 
Italy 
In 1922 King Victor Emmanuel III appointed Mussolini, the leader of the fascists, as prime minister who 
had few hesitations to stay in power using undemocratic means. Although a united opposition expected the 
king to dismiss Mussolini the king failed to act. Mussolini was then entrenched in power establishing a 
dictatorial and brutal government using censorship and terror as an instrument of control. During WWII 
Mussolini committed Italy to the Axis. After the allied invasion of Sicily in 1943 Mussolini was 
overthrown, but with German protection he established a fascist government in Northern Italy. Following 
the surrender of the German Army in 1945 Mussolini was caught and shot by the resistance. In a bid to 
save the dynasty Victor Emmanuel abdicated in May 1946 in favour of his son Umberto II (who had 
assumed some head of state responsibilities from 1944). However, the June 1946 referendum returned a 
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54% vote in favour of republic. 
Laos 
In 1954 the kingdom of Laos gained independence from France, but civil war broke out between the 
royalists and the communist party. The latter emerged victorious in 1975 and the king abdicated. 
Libya 
In Libya, first part of the Ottoman Empire, seized by Italy in 1911–12 and an independent kingdom since 
1951, King Idris was deposed in a 1969 coup by Colonel Gaddafi.  
Maldives  
Maldives gained independence from Britain in 1965 as a sultanate. The sultan was deposed in 1968 after a 
referendum organized by the government. 
Mexico 
After gaining independence from Spain (1821), a military commander Agustin de Iturbide declared himself 
emperor (1822). He was ousted in 1823. In 1864 Archduke Maximilian Habsburg of Austria was installed 
as Mexican emperor with the support of Napoleon III of France. He was toppled by republican rebels in 
1867. 
Montenegro 
Montenegro was recognized as an independent principality in 1878 and as kingdom in 1910. In 1918 at the 
end of WWI Montenegro became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, renamed Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia in 1929. 
Nepal 
Since 1995 Maoist insurgents had been fighting a violent campaign against the Nepalese monarchy, which 
in the past had been interfering in the affairs of government suspending parliament and imposing a state of 
emergency. A period of political instability followed with frequent changes of prime ministers, direct 
control by the king and violent protest against royal rule. The parliament abolished the monarchy as part of 
a peace deal with the Maoist party to join the government in 2007, although internal peace and political 
stability remained elusive. 
Portugal 
Although a constitutional monarchy since 1822, Portugal entered the twentieth century with a political 
system dominated by an oligarchy set against any changes that threatened their privileges. In 1908 the 
unpopular King Carlos I, who had sought to reassert royal executive power by backing a dictatorial 
government, amid a prolonged economic crisis, social unrest and a wave of republicanism, and his heir 
were assassinated. He was succeeded by his second son, Manuel II. Two years later, organized by a secret 
republican society, a military revolt erupted in Lisbon supported by urban lower classes, which prevailed 
over loyalist army units and deposed the monarchy. Beset by political instability the republican constitution 
was brought down in 1926 after a coup which introduced dictatorial rule. 
Romania  
The king of Romania, Carol II, established dictatorship in 1938. Romania entered WWII on the side of the 
Axis. She was occupied in 1944 by the soviet Red Army as the latter was advancing against Germany. 
With the USSR helping local communists to establish friendly governments in order to consolidate the 
security of her borders, King Michael I was forced to abdicate in 1947 and the communist government 
declared the country a people’s republic. 
Russia  
Russia’s military failure in 1916 against the Central Powers of Prussia and Austria led to calls for installing 
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a more politically inclusive government that would include leaders from various political parties and would 
command the confidence of the parliament, rather than just the approval of the Tsar, Nicholas II. Such calls 
were unsuccessfully resisted by the Tsar who abdicated in March 1917, after riots and rebellion in St 
Petersburg. The parliament then established a provisional government of conservatives and moderate 
socialists that wished to continue the war, but was not prepared to meet demands for land redistribution and 
socialism sought by councils (soviets) of peasants and factory workers. In April 1917 Lenin, who declared 
that the aim was a proletarian socialist revolution assumed the leadership of the Bolshevik – Communist 
party which seized power by a coup in October 1917. In March 1918 the new revolutionary government 
accepted a humiliating peace treaty that lost her large territories. Opposition to the peace by moderate 
socialists and conservative elements led to civil war that ended in 1921 with the victory of the communist 
Red Army, while the Tsar and his family had already been executed (July 1918). 
Spain  
The Bourbon Queen Isabella II abdicated after an uprising in 1868 and the Cortes appointed Amadeo of 
Savoy as king.  Amadeo abdicated in 1873 after another revolt and the Cortes proclaimed the First Spanish 
Republic. It lasted until 1874 when a coup restored Isabella’s son Alfonso as monarch. In 1931 the king, 
Alfonso XIII, who had supported a dictatorial government, fled the country following an antimonarchical 
landslide in municipal elections and the Second Republic was proclaimed. During the period 1936–39, a 
civil war was fought between the nationalists and the republican socialists, which was won by the former. 
Their leader, General Franco, established a dictatorship that lasted until his death in 1975. He had 
designated Juan Carlos, grandson of Alfonso XIII, as his successor. As king, Juan Carlos was instrumental 
in establishing constitutional monarchy and the transition of Spain to democracy. 
Tunisia 
Tunisia, a French protectorate, became an independent kingdom in 1956 and the monarchy was abolished a 
year later by the prime minister, who had led the movement for independence 
Turkey – Ottoman Empire  
Contrary to the settlements in Europe, the victors of WWI did not apply the principle of national self–
determination to the peoples and lands of the Ottoman Empire. Instead, its non European territories were 
partitioned into areas of control. The settlement was resisted by a strong nationalist movement based in 
Ankara that after further fighting against Greece (who had been awarded territories in Asia Minor) undid 
the terms of the peace. As the incumbent sultan had accepted the post–WWI settlement, the nationalist 
government abolished the sultanate monarchy in 1922 and set up modern Turkey. Other states born out of 
the Asian and African lands of the Ottoman Empire, including Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia, were set up as monarchies. Following national uprisings and domestic coups, today the monarchy 
survives only in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Neither the successor republics nor the monarchies are 
democratic. 
Yugoslavia – Serbia 
King Alexander banned national political parties in 1929 and assumed executive power alienating non – 
Serb groups of the kingdom. In 1941 the Axis powers invaded and dismantled the kingdom, while King 
Peter II fled. The occupying forces met strong resistance from communist partisans and royalists. The two 
resistance groups also fought each other. By 1943 the partisans succeeded in driving out the Germans 
without the military assistance of the Red Army, and defeated the royalist. The communist constituent 
assembly deposed the monarchy in 1945 and proclaimed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
North Yemen 
In 1948 North Yemen gained independence from the Ottoman Empire and was a hereditary kingdom until 
1962 when army officers seized power, a move that led to civil war between royalists, backed by Saudi 
Arabia, and republicans, backed by Egypt. 
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Sources:  
Gilbert and Clay Large (2002); Jones (1994);  Rohac (2009);  Rose and Kavanagh (1976); Tridimas (2010)  
BBC, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world country profile – timeline   
Encyclopedia Britannica, at http://www.britannica.com 
CIA: The World Factbook available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
World Atlas, at http://www.worldatlas.com/  
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